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ABSTRACT 
China’s economic reform over the past 30 years has allowed the free market to drive economic 
development. However, government still plays a key role in the energy sector by allocating 
energy conservation and emissions abatement. How does the government make an equity 
decision as a tradeoff to market efficiency? This is an unanswered question. The purpose of this 
paper is to illustrate the government’s preference toward equity and efficiency. Using the 
provincial level CO2 intensity allocation data, we investigate the political decision that the 
government made based on the equity and efficiency criteria. We find that the equity index plays 
a more important role than the efficiency index in determining the CO2 intensity target. In 
addition, political factors such as social stability are found to be important factors.   
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1. Introduction 
As the largest energy consumer and greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, China has made substantial 
effort to mitigate the negative effect of global warming and decouple CO2 increases from economic 
growth (Zhang, 2000).1 During the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP) from 2006 to 2010, China succeeded 
in reducing its energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP) by 19.1%. The 12th FYP 
(2011-2015) established a new set of ambitious targets and aggressive policies to promote low 
carbon development. The key targets include a 16% reduction in energy intensity from 2010 levels 
by 2015, and for the first time a 17% reduction in carbon intensity from 2010 levels by 2015 (CO2 
emissions per unit of GDP). The national commitment goal for energy intensity and carbon 
intensity was further distributed at the provincial level.  
The purpose of the paper is to investigate if and in what degree equity and efficiency have been 
considered by the Chinese government in the provincial burden-sharing scheme. The equity 
criteria follows the literature "common but differentiated responsibilities" in that every province 
has the right to use the air but with responsibility (Phylipsen et al., 1998; Baer et al., 2000). This 
requires an even distribution across provinces while the provinces with greater emissions should 
assume greater burdens. The efficiency criteria documented under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) indicates a cost-effective allocation will be the one at 
the lowest possible cost (Shukla, 2005).  This indicates that the provinces with the lowest 
abatement costs should take on additional burdens. A tradeoff exists between these two criteria as 
the provinces with greater emissions should take on greater burdens; however, it leads to less 
efficiency as the provinces may have higher abatement costs. The final results depend on the 
                                                          
1 China’s self-commitment on energy intensity and carbon intensity has gained much international attention (Qiu, 
2009; Stern and Jotzo, 2010; Zhang, 2011) and could serve as an example for the “global problem, local solution”.  
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government preference in weighting equity and efficiency. In addition, the government may have 
other political factors when considering this allocation decision. To reveal this complicated 
political decision, we construct equity and efficiency variables following the literature definition. 
In particular, to construct an efficiency variable, we first derive the shadow price and inefficiency 
level on the basis of the directional distance function. Based on this, we construct the marginal 
abatement cost and abatement potential and hypothesize that they will have a significant 
association to the allocation target should efficiency criteria is considered. An econometric model 
is specified to identify and examine the determinants of the policy-making process from equity 
rules, efficiency rules and other political considerations. 
The major contribution of this paper is that it is the first one to reveal the political decision 
based on equity and efficiency in the provincial burden-sharing scheme. There are few papers that 
put forward an ideal allocation scheme based on efficiency and equity. Yi et al. (2011) presents 
several burden-sharing scenarios based on different preferences by selecting per capita income, 
accumulated emissions from fossil-fuel and energy per unit of industrial value-added to represent 
the CO2 reduction capacity, responsibility and potential, respectively. Wei et al. (2012) simulate 
the distribution scheme among provinces using the Slack-based Measure (SBM) approach to 
establish CO2 equity and efficiency sub-indexes and weight them into an abatement capacity index 
for each province. In comparison, this paper adopts a reverse-thinking strategy to deduce the 
decision making process. Based on the observed scheme from the recent 12th FYP (2011-2015), 
this paper infers the policy-makers’ preference based on equity and efficiency criteria. The results 
suggest that the equity rule is partially followed: The richer regions are found to be assigned more 
loads and the poorer provinces undertake fewer burdens (ability to pay). Unfairly, the provinces 
with more emissions are not assigned more burdens. The current allocation scheme has not 
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reflected any market efficiency as there is weak evidence that the burdens are higher for provinces 
with higher abatement costs. Finally, we identify some political factors that may affect the 
distribution scheme.  For instance, the Chinese government considers social stability caused by 
enviromental conflict, among others.  
The findings of this paper have important implications. First, our results indicate that the 
present top-down allocation scheme of the Chinese government may not be cost effective to reach 
its CO2 abatement target. For instance, the current allocations that satisfy some equity rules do not 
consider the efficiency factors that can lower the total abatement cost. The market allows the 
provinces to trade emission permits to lower the abatement cost. Therefore, further economic 
reform to increase the role of market economy is necessary. Second, our analyses reveal enriched 
behind-the-scenes information and deepens the understanding of the Chinese policy-making 
process, which adds a new case for the Chinese political system studies.  
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the current CO2 allocation 
schemes across the provinces and the related literature. Section 3 proposes the theoretical 
hypotheses. Section 4 sets up the shadow price model that estimates the abatement potential and 
marginal cost, which are used in Section 5 for evaluating efficiency criteria. Section 5 conducts 
regression analysis to examine the role that equity and efficiency play in the policy-making process. 
The conclusion follows in Section 6.  
 
2. Background and Literature 
In order to determine the degree to which the Chinese government follows equity and 
efficiency rules in CO2 allocation, we compare China’s burden-sharing scheme for CO2 intensity 
reduction across provinces (shown in Figure 1) with the European Union (EU) (shown in Figure 
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2). Figure 1 shows the final burden-sharing scheme (CO2 intensity reduction) for 31 provinces 
versus GDP per capita. As we can see, it is not clear if the equity rules are adopted because it 
seems to be a uniform distribution among the provinces. Four less-developed regions, Tibet, 
Qinghai, Hainan and Xinjiang are located far from the dotted line and are allocated a significantly 
lower constraint (10-11%). But, below these four points, some of their poorer counterparts are 
observed to undertake a 16-17% burden.  On the other hand, the group with high GDP per capita, 
like Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Tianjin and Shanghai, are assigned a relatively tight burden 
(19-19.5%).  The remaining sample, excluding the four upper-left provinces, are evenly distributed 
around the dotted line even though all trends seem to be negative between the CO2 reduction goals 
and GDP per capita. 
[Figure 1 is about here] 
Unlike China’s intensity target distribution among regions, the EU sets an emissions cap for 
members (20%). The EU’s burden-sharing scheme, which is established on the solid basis of 
several bottom-up models and the Triptych approach, has been widely evaluated and equity rules 
are adequately addressed (Phylipsen et al., 1998; EU, 1999; Marklund and Samakovlis, 2007; EU, 
2008). Figure 2 plots CO2 reduction distributions among EU members versus GDP per capita. 
There are two marked differences and features between Figure 1 and Figure 2. First, the distributed 
goals for Chinese provinces are all negative, indicating that all provinces must reduce their carbon 
intensity, while EU members are allowed to increase or decrease their emissions. The second 
difference, but the most important, is that EU’s allocation scheme shows a strong negative 
relationship between the reduction target and per capita GDP. The comparison shows that the 
Chinese government follows certain equity rules but they are not as fair as those in the EU. 
Moreover, it is not evidenced from the uniform distribution that the central government has 
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considered differential abatement costs across China’s provinces, where EU’s burden-sharing 
agreement has taken account both efficiency and equity aspects (Marklund and Samakovlis, 2007). 
[Figure 2 is about here] 
Many researchers discuss the rationality of the present regional allocation scheme that has been 
in place since 2010 and reflect that the current allocation is not cost-effective.2 Zhang et al. (2013) 
evaluates various CO2 intensity target allocation plans by developing the China Regional Energy 
Model (C-REM). Their simulation exhibits that more loads are allocated to those regions with 
relatively expensive abatement costs, while provinces with greater abatement opportunities 
undertake less burden. To investigate the impact of the CO2 intensity allocation scheme on 
regional development, Yuan et al. (2012) compares the industry-based and region-based scenarios 
through a multi-regional CGE model. They suggest that a two-step mixed allocation scheme 
should be adopted to narrow the regional development gap. Wang et al. (2013) utilizes a Data 
Envelopment Analysis-based optimization model and proposes a new scheme for the provincial 
CO2 emissions permit allocation by 2020. They formulate disparity targets and assign them to each 
province to meet the CO2 intensity, energy intensity and non-fossil fuel mix constraints, based on 
different scenario assumptions on economics, energy and environmental trends. These studies 
suggest that the current burden-sharing scheme does not appropriately assign the intensity target 
to each province from a cost-effective perspective. 
Given China’s current opaque and secretive political system (Richburg, 2012; Lawrence and 
Martin, 2013), there are no clear and transparent channels for the public to obtain information on 
how the targets are set and what principles have been taken into account during the decision-
making process. The Chinese government announced that the national goal is fairly disaggregated 
                                                          
2 Many previously relevant studies assess the credibility and feasibility of China’s carbon intensity target from policy options and 
technology options (Qiu, 2009; Cohen-Tanugi, 2010; Dai et al., 2011; Jennings et al., 2011; Zhang, 2011). 
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after factoring in regional disparities in resources, development stage, industrial structure, and 
minority areas (Lan, 2012). However, a few isolated words leaked to the media disclosed that the 
final decisions are made by consensus after a three-stage bargaining process between provinces 
and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).3 One of the major concerns for 
central authorities is to ensure “no complaint” among provinces when they are compared to their 
similar counterpart (Feng and Yuan, 2011). This story is consistent with China’s longstanding 
distinct political feature of maintaining political stability by the eventual decision-making group 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Lieberthal, 1997; Ahrens, 2013). Therefore, there is neither an 
official rule nor scientific evidence on how the government designs the distribution scheme. This 
paper tries to determine the mechanism of this complicated economic and political decision.    
 
3. Hypotheses 
The core principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, used widely in the 
international climate negotiation, is also applicable to the carbon intensity burden-sharing among 
regions. To reach an acceptable and feasible regime for each party, the equity and efficiency rules 
have to be emphasized. Based on the equity and efficiency principle, this section proposes several 
hypotheses in line with the Chinese government decisions.     
3.1 Equity 
The fundamental equity principles are defined as the normative criteria for how society should 
be organized and how goods or burdens should be distributed (Rose, 1990). In light of the UN 
                                                          
3 First, the provincial governments are requested to submit their proposed target to the central government. Most provinces 
proposed to follow the national goal, however some provinces proposed higher/lower targets. The NDRC accepted those 
provinces that committed to a higher target and negotiated a new target with the provinces that had committed to the national 
level. This process was then repeated. After three rounds of bargaining, the final figure was examined and approved by the 
National People’s Congress before being announced as part of official provincial tasks.  
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and modern ethical and legal codes, all 
people—regardless of race, age, gender or wealth—enjoy equal rights for the common atmosphere 
resource (Baer et al., 2000). Substantial literature has contributed to develop diverse equity 
principles to define "common but differentiated responsibilities".  
According to China’s consistent advocate on the climate issue, two major equity hypotheses 
are proposed below.4 
H1: The more (historical) emissions, the more burdens should be allocated. 
The egalitarian rule, or per capita entitlement criteria, argues that people have equal rights to 
use atmospheric resources. An equitable allocation should result in equal per capita (accumulated) 
emissions. Most studies claim that the adoption of this principle can ease the path for various 
communities to reach a common abatement agreement (Baer et al., 2000; Metz, 2000). By applying 
this international consensus on regional allocation cases, we anticipate that the province with 
higher per (accumulated) capita CO2 emissions is more likely to have a strict target imposed on 
them. Similarly, the province with lower per (accumulated) capita CO2 has a lower burden to 
reduce its emissions. 
Due to the absence of historical emissions at the provincial level, this paper adopts the per 
capita CO2 to represent the egalitarian rule following most of the previous literature (Baer et al., 
2000; Chakravarty et al., 2009; Wei et al., 2012). An alternative variable, per capita accumulated 
surviving CO2, will be estimated for robust check. Following the above discussion, we expect a 
positive coefficient with its target burden. 
H2: The greater the ability to pay, the more load should be assigned. 
Another widely accepted equity principle in international climate negotiation is “ability to pay”, 
                                                          
4 The sovereignty (grandfathering) rule, which insists that current emission permits should be proportional to history emissions, is 
strongly opposed by China and other developing countries. Thus, we do not apply this rule in current regional allocation plans. 
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which entails that the abatement load should be affordable and commensurate with economic 
circumstances (Rose et al., 1998; Winkler et al., 2002; Shue, 2008). Under this assumption, the 
richer provinces have greater monetary ability to undertake the abatement cost (Wei et al., 2012). 
Consequently, more loads will be assigned to the developed regions. This paper uses the per capita 
GDP to proxy the ability to pay principals and thus a prior expectation for the coefficient is to be 
positive.  
3.2 Efficiency 
The efficiency principle is another pillar of climate mitigation regime and has been well 
documented under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
(Shukla, 2005). It says: “policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective 
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”.   
H3: The greater marginal abatement cost, the less target assignments will be. 
Under the global constraint of being able to ensure a different concentration or temperature 
stabilization target, the distribution schemes with various equity principles will inevitably impose 
different economic impacts on countries (Mattoo and Subramanian, 2011). According to the 
environmental economics theory, the marginal costs of reducing CO2 emissions should be 
equalized across regions to reach the desired target at the minimum overall abatement cost 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988). Thus, a province associated with relatively higher marginal abatement 
costs should take on fewer burdens (Perman, 2003).  
The marginal abatement cost approach has been widely used in the international climate 
negotiation and for scenario analysis. It helps in quantitatively assessing the cost-effectiveness of 
various policy regimes (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998; Rose et al., 1998). For instance, Marklund 
and Samakovlis (2007) use the marginal abatement cost to represent the efficiency indicators when 
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evaluating the EU burden-sharing agreement. They find that the countries with a higher marginal 
cost were assigned easier targets and they conclude that the efficiency rule is addressed. Similarly, 
Wei et al. (2012) uses the marginal abatement cost to construct an efficiency index to present the 
distribution of CO2 intensity target among Chinese provinces. 
H4: The larger the abatement potential, the tighter constraints will be. 
The reduction potential of CO2 is another useful indicator associated with the marginal 
abatement cost to measure the efficiency/performance level in terms of CO2 emissions. i.e., the 
commonly used Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve consists of the abatement potential 
and marginal cost for various abatement options (Criqui et al., 1999). It reflects the currently 
available energy-conservation and carbon-free technology options, and interfuel substitution 
possibility (Guo et al., 2011). This information should naturally be taken into account when sharing 
the burden among regions. In general, keeping other conditions the same, the provinces with larger 
abatement potential should be given a higher burden-sharing target since it contributes more to the 
national goal. Therefore, we raise two hypotheses (H3 and H4) on the efficiency principal. Two 
proxy variables, marginal abatement cost and abatement potential are used to test H3 and H4 below.  
3.3 Political factor 
The carbon intensity goal is one of China’s national environmental goals, which may be a 
lower priority than other political goals (Richerzhagen and Scholz, 2008). If some specific regions 
are associated with sensitive political aspects, i.e., national security or political stability, the 
environmental issue may be sacrificed. Under this setting, we propose the following hypotheses 
below. 
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H5: The greater the income inequality, the fewer requirements will be imposed. 
The pollutant abatement activities are normally associated with economic cost. If one region’s 
economy is highly vulnerable, the additional burden may trigger serious economic depression and 
social problems, which may cause the unemployment rate to increase, or widen the urban-rural 
income gap, especially when external financial support is inadequate. Income inequality then 
exacerbates political instability by aggravating social discontent (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). In 
this case, the central government is cautious in setting up a larger CO2 goal for the region. Since 
China’s official reported unemployment rate only accounts for the registered urban unemployed, 
this paper adopts the ratio of disposable income of urban residents over the net income of rural 
residents. 5 This urban-rural income gap indicator is used to proxy the income inequality, and a 
negative relationship is expected.  
H6: The greater the fragile/alienation of society is, the lower the target will be. 
Increasing terrorism activities in border regions have become a threat to the stability of 
authorities. As Ades and Chua (1997) revealed, the political instability in neighboring countries 
will result in a negative spillover effect. In this context, the central and local governments will put 
their major focus on the national security issue, i.e., expand local military defense and anti-
terror activities, thus the carbon intensity goal is relatively less important. This paper adopts the 
numbers of neighboring foreign countries to proxy the society’s instability circumstance outside. 
The countries with more borders are assumed to have the higher external threat. 
Another internal instability force is the ethnic conflicts in some minority areas. As Hero and 
Tolbert (1996) argued, the political processes and outcomes are significantly influenced by the 
ethnic diversity in the U.S. To investigate the role minority diversity played in China’s policy-
                                                          
5  The national unemployment rate, as reported by the official statistical bureau, maintains a narrow fluctuation in the past decade 
(2003-2013) and ranges from 4.0-4.3%. 
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making process, we use a commonly used index, the ratio of the minority population size in 
minority nationality autonomous areas to the dominant Han population (Sullivan, 1973), to 
measure the diversity for each provincial racial population. It’s expected that greater minority 
diversity is associated with less burden from the environmental aspect.  
H7: The more intensive the environmental conflict, the more burden there will be. 
Besides the economic and social aspect, the increasing environmental degradation and overuse 
of environmental capacity also become crucial sources of political instability. One would expect 
that, in a highly polluted area, the citizens are eager to vent their discontent and express their 
demands through multi-channels, either in public or in private. Consequently, the deteriorating 
environmental situation may lead to widespread mass incidents and violent protests, especially 
when the dialogue channel is seriously absent. It has been viewed as a new security threat by 
central government (Ma, 2008). To soothe sentiment fluctuations, the central authorities expect to 
show their determination on environmental protection by setting up a tighter constraint for the 
polluter (Yang, 1995). Here we use the case number of environmental administrative penalties per 
100 people to picture the environmental conflict. The data are collected from the China 
Environment Yearbook. Positive coefficients are anticipated. 
H8: The greater the bargaining power/possibility is, the larger the requested goal. 
The final burden-sharing allocation may be linked to the network and negotiation power 
between the central government and the local governments. Central government has the power in 
promoting or demoting the local government leaders based on some economic indicators. During 
the provincial leaders’ five-year terms of office, the local governments try to request a relatively 
lower goal so that it is easier to have a better economic indicator measured by GDP. Especially if 
the local government official has a strong connection with the central government, then he may be 
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able to negotiate a relatively lower goal. However, if the local government’s leader is expected to 
be promoted soon and leave the position, he may request a relatively higher target to please the 
central government and leave the responsibility to the future local government leader.  
We thus collect two personal characteristic variables for the most powerful local leader—
secretary of the provincial party committee. To test how the bargaining power affects the final 
allocation, we define a dummy variable Politburo, which is 1 if they are the members of the 
political bureau of the CPC central committee (the top leadership bodies), 0 otherwise. We assume 
that a politburo member has greater power to negotiate with the central government and request a 
lower target. Another variable is the leader’s Age, which is used to proxy the promotion 
possibilities. A negative sign is expected since a younger leader may tend to be more ambitious 
and an older leader may be more conservative. These data are collected from the official profiles 
for political heads from the People’s Website.6  
 
4. Model Specification 
Most of the proxy variables mentioned in section 3 can be collected from statistical yearbooks; 
however, the efficiency components have to be estimated. In this section, we will first derive the 
shadow price and inefficiency level on the basis of directional distance function.7 It is used to 
construct the marginal abatement cost and abatement potential. Finally, an econometric model is 
specified to identify and examine the determinants of the policy-making process.  
                                                          
6  Detailed personal statements for political heads can be accessed via: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/351134/index.html  
7 There are three approaches to derive the marginal abatement cost: the engineering bottom-up approach, the model-derived 
approach and the production-based approach. The present paper uses the production-based approach since it is solidly based in 
production theory, compact specification and its interpretation is straightforward. For more details on the comparison refer to Du 
et al. (2015). 
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4.1 The directional output distance function 
The production technology is given by an output set
 ( ) ( , ) : ( , )N M JP x y b x can produce y b+ + +=    , where Nx + is a vector of input, My +  
is a vector of good output and 
Jb +  is a vector of bad output. This technology is assumed to be 
convex and compact. Furthermore, the inputs and good outputs are freely disposable. This 
assumption infers that it is possible to increase the inputs or reduce the good outputs with other 
conditions remaining unchanged.  
Two environmental axioms are imposed on the P(x) to accommondate the production of bad 
outputs (i.e. pollutant). The first axiom is the good and bad outputs satisfy joint weak disposability, 
i.e.,  ( , ) ( ) 0,1 , ( , ) ( )f y b P x and then y b P xi      . Weak disposability means that any proportional 
reduction of good and bad outputs together is feasible. Another axiom is that bad outputs are jointly 
produced with good outputs, that is: ( , ) ( ) 0, 0f y b P x and b then yi  = = . It implies that no good output 
can be produced without simultaneously creating bad output. The directional output distance 
function is defined by Chung et al. (1997): 
  ( ), , ; , : ( , ) ( )o y b y bx y b g g max y g b g P xD   − = + −   (1) 
Given the environmental production technology P(x), the directional output distance function 
aims to reach the boundary of P(x) along with the directional vector g=(gy,-gb). The value of β* 
measures the maximum distance from any observation within the boundary to its refereed point on 
the frontier. Thus it serves as a measure of inefficiency. A positive oD  indicates that the sample 
can simultaneously expand good output y and cut bad output b by β* so as to hit the frontier along 
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the g direction.8 The higher the value is, the less efficient the output vector is. It takes the value of 
zero when it performs the best and lies on the boundary.  
The directional output distance function inherits its properties from P(x) (Färe et al., 2005). 
That is, ( , , ; )oD x y b g  is concave and non-negative. It is monotonically corresponding to the free 
disposability of inputs and good outputs and the weak disposability of bad outputs, respectively. 
Finally, it satisfies the translation property: 
 ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )o y bD x y g b g g D x y b g  +  −  = −  (2) 
where α is a positive scalar. This property shows that if good output is expanded by αgy and bad 
output is contracted by αgb, then the value of oD will be more efficient in the amount α. It is the 
additive analogue of the multiplicative homogeneity property of the Shephard output distance 
function (Färe et al., 2005). 
4.2 The shadow price model and abatement potential 
Let vectors 
Mp +  and 
Jq +  denote the price of good and bad outputs, respectively. The 
revenue function can be specified as 
,
( , , ) max{ : ( , , ; ) 0}o
y b
R x p q py qb D x y b g= −  . Because many 
observations have a non-negative inefficiency, the efficiency improvement along the direction g 
is feasible; i.e. if ( , ) ( )y b P x , then ( , ) ( )y by g b g P x + −  . The revenue function can be 
rewritten as ( ) ( ), , ; ,, , ,( ) ( ;) o oy bx yR x p q py qb p D qb g g x y b gD g + − +    . It shows that the 
maximum feasible revenue (the left side) is no less than the observed revenue plus efficiency 
gains from an increase in good output along gy and a decrease in bad output along gb.  
                                                          
8 This is the major feature and advantage of the directional output distance function. Compared with the Shephard output distance 
function which seeks to expand both good outputs and bad outputs simultaneously, the directional output distance function 
credits firms to increase the good outputs along vector gy while simultaneously reducing the bad outputs along vector gb. Thus, it 
provides a more reliable measure of true productivity (Chung et al., 1997). 
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By rearranging the revenue function, the directional distance function can be derived from the 
revenue function: ( )
,
( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( )
, , ; min
p q
y b y b
o
R x p q py qb R x p q py qb
x y b g
p g q g p g
D
q g
 − − − − 
 =  
 +   +   
. We can 
then get two first-order conditions by applying the envelope theorem twice for good and bad 
outputs, respectively, that is: ( ), , ;y o
y b
p
D x y b g
p g q g
−
 =
 + 
 and 
( ), , ;b o
y b
q
D x y b g
p g q g
 =
 + 
. The shadow price of the j-th bad output can be specified as (Färe 
et al., 1993)9: 
 
( )
( )
, , ; /
, , ; /
o j
j m
o m
D x y b g b
q p
D x y b g y
  
= −     
 (3) 
In a perfect competitive market, the observed market price of the m-th good output equals its 
absolute shadow price pm. Consequently, we can represent the shadow price for the j-th bad output 
by the product of our normalizing price of m-th good output and the marginal transformation rate 
between j-th bad output and m-th good output.10 The shadow price specification in equation (3) 
captures the loss value in terms of ym when cutting bj marginally on the boundary of P(x). It reflects 
the trade-off relationship between bad output j and tradable good output m and thus can be treated 
as the marginal abatement cost (Marklund and Samakovlis, 2007).  
Since the value of β* measures the maximum feasible reduction of bad output, one may 
construct the partial technical efficiency for the j-th bad output and its supplemental counterpart—
the abatement potential (Wei et al., 2012). That is,  
                                                          
9 Alternatively, we can re-rewrite model (3) as: ( ) ( ), , ; / , , ; /o oD x y b g b D x gq y b yp =    − .  The ratio of the 
shadow price (-q/p) for any observation describes the slope of the tangent line at the boundary of P(x). It reflects the trade-off 
between the bad output and good output, respectively, on the frontier of P(x) where the production is technically efficient.   
10 In our case, we have one good output (GDP) and one bad output (CO2). We assume the shadow price of GDP equals its market 
price and equals 1. Thus, the shadow price of bad output (CO2) can be expressed in Yuan. 
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 ,
, * ,
,
k t
k t
k t
j j
k t
j
j
bprojected bad output
actualbadoutput b
PTE
−
= =  (4) 
 
* ,
,
,
, 1
k t
j k t
jk
t
t
k
j
j
feasible reduction of bad output
PTE
actual badoutput b
AP

= = = −  (5) 
where PTE represents the relatively efficient level in terms of j-th bad output production, and AP 
measures the maximum feasible abatement potential using current available technologies 
compared with the best-performing samples. Since the AP is expressed as the maximum 
percentage that can be reduced of the real bad output, its values are between 0 and 1. A higher 
score of AP means the sample has more removable bad output through efficiency improvement 
(thus a higher AP indicates larger inefficiency). It should be noted that a zero value of AP does not 
mean that the sample cannot further reduce its bad output. Rather, it indicates that the sample is 
Pareto-Koopmans efficient among all of the comparison samples (Charnes et al., 1985). 
To estimate the shadow price in equation (3), a differentiable function of ( ), , ;oD x y b g  is 
needed. The present paper adopts the quadratic function to parameterize the directional output 
distance function.11 As in Färe et al. (2005), we set the directional vector (gy,-gb)=(1,-1) to seek a 
simultaneous expansion in good output and abatement of the pollutant.12 In our case, we have 
k=1,…,30 provinces produce one good output (y) and one bad output (b) with three inputs (x), then 
the quadratic directional distance function is specified as: 
                                                          
11 One can choose either the parametric or the non-parametric approach to represent the directional output distance function. The 
non-parametric method, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is driven by the data itself and does not require any prior 
function form. However, the parametric method is more common when deriving the shadow price since its parametric 
specification is easy for derivation. On the choice of function form, the translog and quadratic functions are two widely used 
models that represent the output distance function. However, the translog function violates the translation property and the 
quadratic model outperforms translog parameterizations when modeling the production technology (Färe et al., 2010). 
12 The setting of the directional vectors may vary and it depends on the purpose. We choose the directional vectors to be uniform, 
i.e., gy=1M, gb=1J. This choice is in line with environmental regulations that require pollutant reduction. In addition, it is easy to 
aggregate the individual unit’s efficiencies (Färe et al., 2005). 
18 
 
 
3
, , , , ,
0 1 1 1 1
1
3 3
, , , 2
' ' 2 2 1
1 ' 1
3 3
, , , , ,
1 1 1 1
1 1
,
, 2
1
,
( , , ;1, 1
1 1 1
)
2
)
(
2
(
2
)
k t k t k t k t k t
n n
n
k t k t k t
nn n n
n n
k t k t k t k t k t
n n
k t
o
k t
k t
n n k t
n n
y b x y b
x x y
D x
b
y x b y bx
   
  
    
=
= =
= =
− = + + +
+ + +
+ + + + +


 
 (6) 
where parameters k  and t  are used to capture the individual and time effects, respectively. 
Following Aigner and Chu (1968), the unknown parameters in equation (6) are estimated with a 
deterministic linear programming (LP) approach by minimizing the sum of the deviation of the 
individual observations from the frontier. 
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The first constraint ensures that all observations are feasible. The monotonicity assumption in 
bad outputs, good outputs and inputs are imposed by the inequality (ii) - (iv), respectively. The 
restrictions given by (v) and (vi) impose translation property and symmetry conditions, 
respectively.  
4.3 The preference identification model 
To investigate the role of equity and efficiency principles played in shaping the regional 
burden-sharing scheme, an econometric model is specified as follows: 
 , , , , ,k k t k t k t k t k ttar Equity Efficiency Politic X     = +  +  +  +  +  (8)
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where tar denotes the assigned 12th FYP CO2 intensity target for k-th province. The vectors Equity, 
Efficiency and Politic correspond to the equity, efficiency and politic hypothesis in section 3, 
respectively. The vector X includes control variables that the policymakers may consider. For 
instance, we control for structural characteristics measured by the share of industrial value-added 
in GDP.  Considering China as a coal-dominated country, we control the fuel mix by adopting the 
coal share in total end-user energy consumption. The error term ε is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with all independent variables and uncorrelated in time and across regions (Marklund and 
Samakovlis, 2007).  
The prior expectations for the regression are following the discussion in Section 3. The 
coefficients of equity index are expected to be significantly positive in the case that equity rule is 
well addressed. That is, the provinces with lower per capita CO2 levels should be allocated less 
burdens, and the historical per capita emissions should be positively associated with the allocation 
target. The coefficients for the efficiency variable are expected to be significantly negative for the 
marginal abatement cost and significantly positive for the abatement potential. If the government 
considers the efficiency criteria, the provinces with higher marginal abatement costs should take 
on less burdens. Similarly, the provinces with higher abatement potential should be allocated more 
burdens. We adopt several measurements in considering political effect on our regression and 
expect to see significant negative coefficients of the index measuring income inequality and social 
instability. For instance, the higher the number of environmental administrative penalties should 
expect to induce a tighter target.     
 
20 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 First stage: estimate the marginal abatement cost and abatement potential 
The data covering 30 provinces for the period 1997 to 2010 are used in estimating model (7) 
in the first stage. 13 The three inputs are labor, capital stock and energy consumption, and the two 
output variables are economic output (GDP) and CO2 emissions. The labor input is measured by 
the number of employed. The GDP is deflated to the constant 2005 price. Both variables are 
obtained from China Statistical Yearbooks (NBS, 2012b). The energy consumption information is 
collected from China Energy Statistical Yearbooks (NBS, 2012a). Since the capital stock is 
unavailable from statistical books, the widely accepted Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) is used 
to estimate the stock of fixed assets at the 2005 price.14 
The data on CO2 emissions at the provincial level are unavailable. To tackle this, the CO2 
emissions from major fossil-fuel, combined with the cement production, are estimated according 
to International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines. Specifically, the CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel can be estimated from the formula: ( )2 44 /12i i i iCO E CF CC COF=     , where 
subscript i indexes six types of fossil fuel including coal, gasoline, kerosene, diesel, fuel oil and 
natural gas. E, CF, CC and COF represent fuel consumption in physical units, transformation 
factor, carbon content and carbon oxidation factor, respectively. The term 44/12 is the ratio of the 
mass of one carbon atom combined with two oxygen atoms to the mass of an oxygen atom. We 
also consider the inter-provincial electricity trade. For the net electricity exporter in a given year, 
                                                          
13  There are 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities on the Chinese mainland. This study does not include Hong 
Kong SAR, Macao SAR or Taiwan Province. Tibet is excluded because of the absence of energy data. The starting year is set as 
1997 for two reasons. One is that the Chongqing was settled as a municipality in 1997. The other reason is that most detailed end-
user energy consumptions are unavailable before mid-1990s.    
14 The estimation of capital stock is given as: 
, , 1 ,
(1 )
i t i t i i t
K K I
−
= − +  , where I, K and ρ are investment, capital stock and 
depreciation rate for province i in year t. The data of initial capital stock and depreciation rate come from Zhang et al. (2004). 
The annual investment is collected from the China Statistical Yearbook. All serial data are converted to 2005 prices. 
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the embedded emissions associated with the exported electricity quantity are deducted from that 
province's total emissions (Du et al., 2012). All of the energy consumption data are taken from the 
energy balance tables by regions in the China Energy Statistical Yearbooks. The cement 
production data are collected from various Statistical Yearbooks from each province over various 
years.  
Table 1 summarizes the statistics for all three inputs and two outputs. A quick expression is, 
the labor declined slowly in the first several years and then continuously increased. Driven by a 
13.5% annual growth rate of capital stock, the GDP increased 10.8% per year. During this period, 
the energy consumption grew at an annual rate of 7.7%, associated with an annual rate of 7.2% for 
CO2 emission. Accordingly, the mean provincial CO2 intensity declined before 2002 after 
experiencing a deep climbing during 2003-2005, it shows a downward trend.   
[Table 1 is about here] 
The GAMS/MINOS-solver is adopted to solve the linear problem at system equation (7). All 
input/output variables are normalized by their mean value to overcome the convergence problem. 
This normalization implies that (x, y, b) = (1, 1, 1) for a hypothetical province that uses mean 
inputs and produces mean outputs. The results of parameter estimates are provided in Table 2. 
Note that the parameters in the table are computed from the linear programming. It differs from 
econometrics estimation coefficients in that a positive/negative parameter for one province (year) 
does not represent that it is less/more efficient than the benchmark. The value of inefficiency 
(directional distance function) for various provinces and years can be calculated using these 
parameters. 
[Table 2 is about here] 
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Table 3 summarizes the estimation of directional distance function, marginal abatement costs 
and abatement potential by region and period.15  First, the estimated value of the directional 
distance function (0.0618) is close to other similar studies. For example, Murty et al. (2007) reports 
an inefficient estimate of 0.06 for a representative India power generation firm. Marklund and 
Samakovlis (2007) report an inefficient value range of 0.02-0.06 for EU members. Our results 
indicate that, for a hypothetical province who used the mean inputs to produce mean outputs during 
1997-2010, it could, on average, expand its GDP by 39.14 (633.33*0.0618) billion Yuan and cut 
its CO2 by 9.08 (146.904*0.0618) million tons. Second, the average marginal abatement cost 
indicates that the hypothetical province can cut an additional one ton of CO2 emissions with the 
cost of 1359.7 Yuan.16 Among three regions, the east area (2376.4 Yuan/ton) registers a higher 
cost for cutting an additional one unit of CO2, followed by the middle (1032.5 Yuan/ton) and west 
(597.4 Yuan/ton). From the timeline view, the cost to reduce the carbon is becoming more 
expensive. Third, the average abatement potential during the whole period is 7.39, which suggests 
that the hypothetical province can relatively reduce its CO2 by 7.39% when compared with the 
best-performance provinces. There exists remarkable regional disparity. During 1997-2010, the 
east region holds the larger potential for further emissions control than the middle and west area 
on average. However, we have to point out that the east region has lower abatment potential than 
the middle and west area after 2006. This may result from the regional development gap, industry 
                                                          
15  The east region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and 
Hainan. The middle region includes Shanxi, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan. The west region 
includes Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. 
16 As equation (3) shows, the shadow price is expressed as a ratio. In the case of the denominator ( ), , ; /
o m
D x y b g y   equals 
zero, the shadow price is not available. We use the estimated coefficient in Table 2 to compute equation (3) and find that six 
observations miss the shadow price value. They are: Liaoning (2000), Jiangsu (2010), Guangdong (2009, 2010), and Sichuan 
(2005, 2006).    
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transfer and absence of available technical options.17 However, along with more measures and 
efforts been implemented, it leaves less space and more difficulties for further abatement activities. 
 [Table 3 is about here] 
5.2 Second stage: identifying the preference 
We conduct the regression analysis on model (8) based on the marginal abatement cost and 
abatement potential estimated in Section 5.1. Table 4 summarizes the independent variables. The 
variables are selected from the theory postulation in Section 2.  
[Table 4 is about here] 
Since the target for period 2010-2015 was set in 2010, model (8) assumes that each province’s 
target in the future is a linear function of its historical behaviors and performance. However, it is 
uncertain how much historical information was obtained and to what extent the decision-makers 
adopted the historical information. We set up three scenarios for our analysis. First, we assume 
that the latest information may exert the greatest influence. In this case, the one-year lag item (2009 
data) is used to explain the decision made in 2010. In the second case, the variables are measured 
by the average level of the past five years (2005-2009). The third scenario picks up all available 
13-year average data (1997-2009). In each case, we have a cross-section dataset covering 30 
provinces. Given our small sample size, the regional effect (east, middle and west) instead of the 
individual provincial effect is controlled.   
[Table 5 is about here] 
                                                          
17 Note that the abatement potential is declining for the east region and is increasing for the middle and west regions from 1997 
through 2010. The east region has a higher abatement potential before 2006 since it was associated with higher industrial 
composition, compared with the agriculture-based middle and west regions. However, along with the industrial upgrading and 
transfer, increasing inefficient sectors in the east region were moved to the middle and west regions, abatement potential for the 
east region has declined over the years and now has a lower abatement potential than the middle and west regions since 2000.   
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Table 5 displays the initial regression result. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show estimations for all 
variables by using one-year lag, the past five-year average and the past 13-year average as 
independent variables, respectively. Columns (2), (4) and (6) list each type’s compact specification 
with selected variables by using a stepwise regression procedure. Looking at the statistical 
information for each regression, we find that column (2) has the greatest explanation power as it 
has the largest adjusted-R2 and the smallest AIC and BIC criterion. It suggests that the one-year 
lag data fit the model better than the five-year average and historical average. Thus, we will adopt 
the one-year lagged data.  
Column (2) in Table 5 reveals the potential driving force for the CO2 intensity distribution. It 
includes the per capita CO2 and income, minority percentage, environmental penalty number, coal 
share in fuel and industrial composition. It should be noted that this OLS regression result is 
sensitive to outliers as the sample size is small. To eliminate the impact of outliers and gain robust 
estimators for a small sample, the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator is preferable as an 
alternative approach (Greene, 2011, p 203). We resample the data with 500 bootstrap replications 
and report both OLS and LAD in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6, respectively.   
Besides the bootstrap LAD, another approach is used to enrich the sample size for a robust 
check. The  energy-intensity target data for the 11th FYP (2005-2010), which was distributed 
among provinces in 2005, are used to proxy the CO2 intensity. The reason to do so is that the 
energy intensity trend is parallel with (or consistent with) CO2 intensity when energy mix does 
not change.18 We pool the 2005 and 2010 targets for 30 provinces as dependant variables. The 
one year lag of independent variables is used for selected variables as shown in Table 5. 
                                                          
18 The CO2 intensity can be represented as the energy intensity multiplied by the CO2 emission per energy in line with KAYA 
identity. That is: (CO2/Y)=(CO2/E)*(E/Y). In case of stable fuel emission factors and fuel mix, the trend of CO2 intensity is 
consistent with the energy efficiency. 
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Moreover, we add a dummy variable d2005 to distinguish two allocation themes. It equals 1 for 
2005 energy intensity allocation and 0 for 2010 CO2 intensity distribution. The OLS and 
bootstrap LAD are listed in columns (3) and (4), respectively. 
The historical emissions are as important as or even more important as current emissions since 
historical emissions can stay in the atmosphere for centuries and further aggravate the greenhouse 
effect (Chinadaily, 2013). However, this historical emissions stock indicator is less popular than 
emissions flow because it is difficult to define and measure accurately. Here we construct an 
alternative variable, the per capita historical CO2 emissions (H1b_rhCO2) to replace the per capita 
CO2 (H1a_rCO2) for robust check.
19 Columns (5) and (6) in Table 6 apply the OLS and LAD for 
2010 data, respectively. Similarly, columns (7) and (8) in Table 6 report the OLS and LAD for 
pooled data, respectively.  
[Table 6 is about here] 
If we treat the OLS estimation for 2010 data in column (1) as a benchmark and compare other 
columns against it, the bootstrap approach is found to generate a similar estimation with less 
significant levels. Similarly, the pooled regression yields a consistent estimation with low 
explanation power. The use of alternative variables gives a very close result. Column (1) seems to 
perform the best among all specifications in terms of its statistical information.     
                                                          
19  The attenuation of CO2 in the atmosphere is taken into account because the ocean and forest possess carbon sink functions. 
Following Siegenthaler (1983), the surviving emission for base year’s emission b(0) in year t can be estimated via  
/ 7 / 71 /815
( ) (0) (0.3 0.34 0.36 )
t t t
b t b e e e
− − −
=  + + with a non-linear diminishing rate. The per capita accumulated surviving CO2 
emission in year t is defined as 
0
( ) /
T
tt
b t pop
= , where numerate is aggregated historical surviving emissions until t-th year 
and popt is population size in year t. Based on the data’s availability, the annual national emissions during 1971 to 1996 are taken 
from IEA’s dataset (IEA, 2012), while the emissions for each province afterward is our calculation. We first estimate the 
surviving CO2 stock through 1996 and then split it into each province based on their emission proportion in 1997. Then we set 
1996 as the base year and re-estimate the surviving emissions for the period 1997-2010 at province level. This serial is divided by 
the population yield of the variable of per capita accumulated surviving emission. 
26 
 
As we can see by comparing Tables 5 and 6, equity hypotheses H1 is not supported while H2 
is strongly supported. As we discussed in Section 2, both coefficients of equity index are expected 
to be positive in case that equity rule is well addressed. However, the insignificant negative 
coefficients for H1a_rCO2 in Table 6 reveal that the egalitarian rule is not being taken into account 
by the current burden-sharing scheme. The significant negative results of per capita CO2 in column 
(1) in Table 6 is caused by the multicollinearity between the per capita GDP and the per capita 
CO2. If we drop per capita GDP, the coefficient of per capita CO2 becomes insignificant (the results 
are available upon request). Since both variables are our concern and the correlation does not 
change our conclusion, we thus include both of them in the same model. Similarly, the historical 
per capita emissions (H1b_rhCO2) are insignificant and negatively associated with the target in 
Table 6. Differently, the significant positive sign for H2_rgdp is consistent with our expectation. 
Note the conclusion remains the same if we drop the per capita CO2, which correlates with per 
capita GDP. That is, the per capita GDP is still significant. It shows that the “ability to pay” rule 
is fully considered by the policy-makers: the richer regions are assigned more loads while the 
poorer provinces undertake fewer burdens. 
The next two coefficients in Table 5 show that the criterion of efficiency is not followed in 
China. It is expected that the marginal abatement cost (H3) will be negative and the abatement 
potential (H4) will be positive if the criterion of efficiency is fully considered during the decision-
making process. However, the coefficient of marginal abatement cost (H3_cmac) in Table 5 shows 
that the marginal abatement cost is either insignificant or positively correlated with the dependent 
variable. The coefficients for the abatement potential (H4_cpot) are not significant across all 
estimations. These results are consistent with the literature (Yuan et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013; 
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Zhang et al., 2013) and suggest that the current burden-sharing scheme does not appropriately 
assign the intensity target to each province from a cost-effective perspective. 
We adopt several measurements in considering political effect on our regression  at Table 5. 
As we can see, the coefficient of income inequality measurement (H5_incomegap) is not 
significant and thus it indicates that the urban-rural income gap variable was not so great as to be 
seriously taken into account by the central authorities. Similarly, the coefficient of H6a_foreign is 
insignificant and near zero, indicating that the social instability dimension (H6) is not supported. 
On the other hand, the internal society alienation, indicated by the minority area, raises the policy-
makers attention when setting up the burden-sharing scheme. The variable H6b_minority gains a 
significantly negative coefficient in all columns in Table 6, as predicted by H6. Furthermore, the 
magnitude among all coefficients reveals that it plays a crucial role. This is consistent with 
previous empirical evidence in the U.S., which suggests that the heterogeneous environments may 
be associated with positive policy outcomes for minorities (Hero and Tolbert, 1996). Beyond the 
economic and social dimensions, the environment induced political instability factor (H7) is also 
tested. The positive coefficients for H7b_penalty across most columns suggest that the higher the 
number of environmental administrative penalties a province has, the more likely a tighter target 
will be allocated.  
Finally, the estimation results provide weak evidence that the local leader matters in the 
central-local bargaining process. Column (1) in Table 5 reports a negative sign for leaders’ age 
and politburo position variables. It indicates that the provincial leader may not exert influence 
when determining the CO2 intensity target. Alternatively, we do not observe direct and confidential 
impact of local leaders on this provincial burden-sharing theme. Moreover, the positive sign for 
fuel mix (share_coal) suggests that the coal-dominated provinces will be punished with heavier 
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burdens, which is consistent with Marklund and Samakovlis (2007). However, the industrial 
composition is not significant in most columns. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates political decisions that the Chinese government made based on equity 
and efficiency in the provincial burden-sharing scheme. We proposed eight hypotheses based on 
the theory and literature. Using the data from Statistical Yearbooks and estimated efficiency 
components in the paper, 30 provinces for the period 1997 to 2010 are used in estimating the 
econometric model. In general, our findings suggest that the CO2 allocation scheme considers more 
political factors, less equity and shows the least efficiency in their decision.  
The paper consistently finds that the egalitarian rule is not taken into account for the current 
burden-sharing scheme. However, the “ability to pay” rule is well addressed by the policy-makers 
as we do find that the richer regions are assigned more loads while the poorer provinces undertake 
fewer burdens.  
The paper finds that the policy-makers do not take the efficiency principle into consideration. 
We do not find significant results that either the provinces with higher costs to reduce one 
additional unit of CO2 are assigned fewer goals, or provinces with relatively small abatement costs 
were assigned easier emissions constraints. These findings are consistent with previous similar 
studies, i.e., Zhang et al. (2013), which suggest that the present burden-sharing scheme may miss 
cost-effective opportunities since it assigned a larger load to the highly constrained and costly 
provinces.  
The policy-makers do consider some political factors. The paper finds that the internal society 
alienation raised the policy-makers’ attention when setting up the burden-sharing scheme. The 
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provinces with more minority groups are allocated less burden. The higher number of 
environmental administrative penalties a province has, the more likely it is to be allocated a tighter 
target. We do not find that social instability from the urban-rural income gap or a political leader’s 
characteristics are associated with the CO2 allocation. These findings also coincide with the 
theoretical literature on China’s political system, which claims that political context should be 
fully accounted for in order to understand China’s environmental issue (Lieberthal, 1997). It is 
also consistent with empirical studies, i.e., Jia (2014) empirically examined and presented evidence 
on the impact of China’s political incentives on the environment. 
The findings of the paper have important policy implications. First, for China’s decision-
makers, we identify the shortcomings of the current burden-sharing schemes. We should be aware 
of the huge difference between our allocations from the EU’s. As we stated above, the equity rule 
is partially followed. We should pay more attention to historical emissions and require the province 
to take a larger burden of responsibility. We shall improve the allocation efficiency, which may 
rely on further reform to increase the role of market economy and allow emission trade across the 
provinces. Second, our paper not only presents the case of China, but also provides a good example 
of the climate problem and solution as documented as “global problem, local solution”.20  
Nevertheless, our study leaves several points for future exploration. For instance, instead of 
revealing the current preferences of decision makers, future research shall provide a scientific 
“optimal distribution scheme” by following the least-cost rule. One specific direction may be to 
                                                          
20 Unlike the long-running international climate negotiations, China’s self-commitment on energy intensity since 2005 and on 
carbon intensity since 2010 illustrates that China is keen on the “common but differentiated responsibilities”, an initiative that has 
gained international respect. It reflects the China-US joint climate change agreement that both countries announced in their 
unilateral measures and domestic goals by 2030. Following this tune, the Lima Climate Change Conference in December 2014, 
saw for the first time all parties agreeing to cut the CO2 emissions even though it was weak and many difficult decisions need to 
be tackled later. Thus, when it’s hard to reach an agreement on a global challenge, the local solution and action that China has 
utilized may become a second-best strategy.  
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derive the provincial optimal reduction based on the marginal abatement cost curve. This may 
provide more clear efficiency measurement. In addition, the political factors play a more 
comprehensive role in the decision-making process. Its measurement and influence mechanism 
needs to be more carefully explored and examined in the future.    
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